

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DAKAR 05719 01 OF 02 281547Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
DODE-00 L-03 IO-13 /081 W
-----125808 281652Z /44

O 281130Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5105
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA QPQY
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BANJUL UNN
AMEMBASSY BISSAU UNN
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY PRAIA UNN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 DAKAR 5719

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, PINT, MILI
SUBJECT: AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE CALL ON SENGHOR
JULY 27, 1978

1. SUMMARY. AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY CALLED ON SENEGALESE
PRESIDENT SENGHOR JULY 27. MOOSE ACCOMPANIED BY AF/W
DIRECTOR AND AMBASSADOR COHEN AND SENGHOR BY SENEGALESE
AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. COULBARY. SENGHOR REQUESTED U.S.
ASSISTANCE FOR INFRASTRUCTURE IN SAHEL AND FOR AFRICAN
MODERATES. HE TERMED OAU'S SUMMIT AS A VICTORY FOR MOD-
ERATES. MOOSE SUMMARIZED U.S. VIEWS ON ZAIRE AND ETHIOPIA.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAKAR 05719 01 OF 02 281547Z

END SUMMARY.

2. SENGHOR BEGAN WITH HALF-HOUR STATEMENT WHICH COVERED
SAHEL, WESTERN SAHARA, OAU SUMMIT, AND MIDDLE EAST.

3. SAHEL DROUGHT: SENGHOR SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM
OF THE SAHEL DROUGHT, AND WE KNOW WHAT THE SOLUTIONS

SHOULD BE. OUR PRINCIPAL NEEDS ARE DAMS AND REFORESTATION. THE DAMS ARE REQUIRED ON THE SENEGAL RIVER AND THE GAMBIA. MUCH OF THE NECESSARY FINANCING FOR THE FIRST PHASE IS AVAILABLE FROM ARAB AND EUROPEAN SOURCES, BUT WE WOULD APPRECIATE U.S. ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE CILSS, OMVS OR THE OMVG.

4. ASSISTANCE TO MODERATES: SENGHOR EMPHASIZED THE NEED OF THE MODERATE STATES IN AFRICA FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST. "WE DO NOT NEED TROOPS," HE SAID, "BUT WE DO NEED AID." HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE NECESSITY FOR SENEGALESE BATTALION IN ZAIRE TO RELY ON THE TWO MOROCCAN BATTALIONS FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. SAUDI ARABIAN PROVIDED 7 MILLION FRENCH FRANCS TO THE FRENCH WHICH HAD BEEN SPENT ON THE MOROCCANS; FRANCE GAVE SENEGAL NOTHING. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION HE RENEWED HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE AND CALLED FRANCE "STINGY," WHERE SUPPORT FOR SENEGALESE EFFORTS IN THE SHABA IS CONCERNED. HE JUSTIFIED HIS REQUEST BY CITING THE THREAT POSED BY THE "PROGRESSIVES" IN AFRICA AND IN PARTICULAR ALGERIA AND LIBYA, WHOM HE TERMED THE PRINCIPAL SOVIET AGENTS IN AFRICA. HE FOUND IT ILLOGICAL THAT THESE PROGRESSIVE STATES SHOULD RECEIVE BOTH MILITARY AID FROM THE SOVIETS AND ECONOMIC AID FROM THE WEST.

5. OAU SUMMIT: HE SAID THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN A GOOD
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DAKAR 05719 01 OF 02 281547Z

MEETING, BUT DESPITE HIS SUGGESTIONS AT THE OUTSET, TOO MUCH TIME HAD BEEN WASTED IN GENERAL DEBATE AND TOO LITTLE TIME HAD BEEN SPENT IN CLOSED SESSION.

A. WESTERN SAHARA. THE WESTERN SAHARA HAD BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT IN BOTH THE GENERAL DEBATE AND IN CLOSED SESSION. PRESIDENT KEREKOU OF BENIN HAD MADE A LONG SPEECH ("IN VERY BAD FRENCH") IN SUPPORT OF THE POLISARIO WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY MADAGASCAR. MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA HAD EXERCISED THEIR RIGHTS OF REPLY. SENGHOR HAD MADE CLEAR HIS VIEW THAT ALGERIA AND THE POLISARIO WERE ESSENTIALLY RACIST AND ANTI-BLACK. NIGERIAN HEAD OF STATE OBASANJO HAD INTERVENED ON THE SIDE OF THE MODERATES, "FOR WHICH," SAID SENGHOR, "I SUPPOSE THE U.S. CAN TAKE CREDIT."

B. MODERATES VS. PROGRESSIVES. IN GENERAL, THE SESSION HAD BEEN A VICTORY FOR THE MODERATES. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN SENGHOR OBJECTED, SOME "PROGRESSIVE" CANDIDATES HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE ELECTIONS TO THE BUREAU AND THUS THE MAJORITY OF THE NEW BUREAU IS COMPOSED OF MODERATES.

C. INTER-AFRICAN FORCE. "PROGRESSIVES" HAD ACCUSED THE WEST OF INTERVENTION IN AFRICA. SENGHOR HAD SUGGESTED A RESOLUTION CALLING ON PARTICIPANTS IN THE HELSINKI ACCORD NOT TO INTERVENE IN AFRICA AND, DESPITE SOME INITIAL DOUBTS AMONG THE MODERATES, HAD SUCCEEDED IN PUTTING THE RESOLUTION TO A VOTE. THE "PROGRESSIVES" VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION AND IT WAS DEFEATED 21-20 WITH 7 ABSTENTIONS. SENGHOR SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL VICTORY FOR THE MODERATES BECAUSE IT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE "PROGRESSIVES" WERE NOT PREPARED TO RENOUNCE FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA.

D. CANARY ISLANDS. INDEPENDENCE FOR ISLANDS SUCH AS THE CANARIES HAD BEEN DEBATED. SENGHOR SAID HE HAD RIDDEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 DAKAR 05719 01 OF 02 281547Z

CULED "PROGRESSIVE" OPPOSITION TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CANARIES, ASKING HOW THE PROGRESSIVES COULD BE IN FAVOR OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE WESTERN SHARA AND OPPOSED TO IT FOR A MUCH LARGER NUMBER OF CANARY ISLANDERS WHO WISHED TO REMAIN PART OF SPAIN.

6. MIDDLE EAST: SENGHOR TERMED BEGIN "SINCERE BUT A ZEALOT." HE RECALLED HIS BELIEF THAT THE WEST COULD WORK THROUGH AND WITH SHIMON PERES AND CAREFULLY INDICATED THAT HE INTENDS TO SEE HIM AGAIN SHORTLY.

7. MAURITANIA: SENGHOR NOTED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A VISIT FROM MAURITANIAN DELEGATION LED BY COL AHMED SALEM OULD SIDI: HE SAID THE PRESENT MAURITANIAN GOVERNMENT WANTS PEACE BECAUSE IT WANTS TO RESUME TRADE. SENGHOR SAID THAT SENEGALESE HAD LIVED ALONGSIDE MOORS THROUGHOUT THEIR HISTORY, BUT HAD NEVER FULLY UNDERSTOOD THEM. HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE PRESENCE OF MANY SENEGALESE IN MAURITANIA, AND CLAIMED THAT THE MAURITANIAN POPULATION IS ONE-THIRD MOORISH, ONE-THIRD BLACK MAURITANIANS AND ONE-THIRD SENEGALESE BROUGHT IN BY THE FRENCH IN 1905.

HE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR BLACKS AND MOORS TO LIVE TOGETHER AND UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD SEE A LEADER OF THE POLISARIO, WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, IN FRANCE AND EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO ASSESS POLISARIO VIEWS THEN. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE SAID MOROCCO WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE THE WAR RATHER THAN GIVE UP THE NORTHERN TWO-THIRDS OF THE WESTERN SAHARA. HE THOUGHT THE MOST FEASIBLE SOLUTION TO MAURITANIA'S DESIRES TO GET OUT OF THE WAR WOULD BE A MAURITANIAN FEDERATION IN WHICH THE SAHRAOUI WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE AUTONOMY IN THE SOUTHERN THIRD OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 DAKAR 05719 01 OF 02 281547Z

WESTERN SAHARA. HE THOUGHT AN INDEPENDENT POLISARIO STATE IN THE SOUTHERN THIRD WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO MOROCCO BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE ALGERIA ACCESS TO THE ATLANTIC. GE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON ALGERIA AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT. HE SUMMARIZED THE SITUATION BY SAYING THAT THE NEW MAURITANIAN GOVERNMENT WANTS PEACE BUT DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO GET IT. MOOSE NOTED U.S. SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DAKAR 05719 02 OF 02 281626Z
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00
DODE-00 L-03 IO-13 /081 W
-----126702 281652Z /44

O 281130Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5106
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BANJUL UNN
AMEMBASSY BISSAU UNN
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY PRAIA UNN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 DAKAR 5719

8. ETHIOPIA: SENGHOR DREW ATTENTION TO WHAT HE TERMED THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA AND URGED THAT THE U.S. STAY IN TOUCH WITH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT.

MOOSE REPLIED BY NOTING THAT THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN GRANTED AN EARLY APPOINTMENT TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS, AND THAT WE INTENDED TO KEEP THE LINES OPEN. MOOSE NOTED OUR CONCERN FOR THE RISING LEVEL OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN THE OGADEN. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD SIAD THE U.S. WOULD PROVIDE LIMITED AMOUNTS OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT TO SOMALIA IF THE SOMALIS PROVIDED FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT USE FORCE AGAINST THEIR NEIGHBORS. BECAUSE OF ETHIOPIAN CONCERNS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DAKAR 05719 02 OF 02 281626Z

REGARDING INSURGENT ACTIVITY, WE HAD DELAYED SENDING A SURVEY MISSION TO MOGADISCIO. SENGHOR NOTED THAT MENGISTU WAS BLACK AND NOT AMHARIC. HE NOTED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND MENGISTU. AT THE OAU, HE SAID, THERE HAD BEEN GENERAL SUPPORT FOR SIAD BUT ALSO A MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF ERITRAN AUTONOMY BECAUSE IT HAD ITS ORIGINS IN A UN RESOLUTION. MOOSE NOTED THREE AREAS IN WHICH SOVIET/CUBAN DIFFERENCES WITH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT GROW:

A. THE EPLF/ELF OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS WAS GENERALLY FAVORED BY THE SOVIETS, BUT RESISTED BY MENGISTU, WHO WISHED A MILITARY VICTORY.

B. INCREASING ETHIOPIAN SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF ATTACKING SOMALIA IS OPPOSED BY THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS.

C. THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FORMATION OF A POPULAR PARTY, WHICH IS OPPOSED BY MENGISTU WHO FAVORS A MORE RESTRICTIVE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

9. ZAIRE: MOOSE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SENEGALESE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIMITED U.S. ROLE IN THE SHABA AND SAID THAT U.S. WOULD LOOK CLOSELY AT THE POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO IT TO SUPPORT THE SHABA OPERATION MATERIALLY.

10. ANGOLA/ZAIRE: MOOSE NOTED U.S. ROLE IN SEEKING TO BRING ABOUT ANGOLA/ZAIRE RECONCILIATION THROUGH BRAZZAVILLE ACCORD.

11. VISAS: AT CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT, MOOSE RAISED PROBLEMS CAUSED FOR U.S. PERSONNEL IN WESTERN SAHEL AND BISSAU STEMMING FROM SENEGALESE REFUSAL TO GRANT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DAKAR 05719 02 OF 02 281626Z

MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS AND SENEGALESE DELAYS IN GRANTING
SINGLE ENTRY VISAS. SENGHOR WAS CLEARLY AWARE OF THE
PROBLEM AND EMPHASIZED THAT SENEGALESE POLICY WAS
DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIETS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD
TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR
FRANCE THE NEXT DAY TO ASK HIM TO LOOK INTO IT AND TO
SEE IF SOME RELAXATION OF THE POLICY AS REGARDS
AMERICANS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.
COHEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978DAKAR05719
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780310-0502
Format: TEL
From: DAKAR
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780711/aaaaaiqj.tel
Line Count: 287
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8c75566b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1858576
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE CALL ON SENGHOR JULY 27, 1978
TAGS: OVIP, PINT, MILI, (SENGHOR, LEOPOLD SEDAR), (MOOSE, RICHARD M)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8c75566b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014